
The 13th volume in the RUSCH series, and the fifth to focus on Theophrastos’ colleagues, pupils and successors, is dedicated to the Peripatetic philosopher Ariston of Keos. This is a landmark in the Aristonean scholarship and another valuable addition to the study of the Peripatetic tradition. A new edition of the fragments and testimonia of Ariston together with an English translation and notes makes up almost half of the book (177 pages), and is followed by eight essays on problems connected with Ariston, his works and the scientific atmosphere of his time. Between the edition and the articles there are concordances, which relate this edition to various earlier ones, an “Index of Aristonean texts either printed or entered in the apparatus or in a separate list”, an index of cited passages of other authors, an index of names (including geographical names), and, finally, an index of modern scholars. The eight papers are followed by a separate index of ancient sources, but unfortunately no other indexes.

The fragments of Ariston have been edited by Peter Stork, Tiziano Dorandi, William W. Fortenbaugh and Johannes M. van Ophuijsen. The texts in the edition are divided into five sections: 1) Life [1-6], 2) Writings (certain) [7-17], 3) Writings (disputed) [18-29], 4) Sayings [30], and 5) Not Accepted [31-49].

1 Vol. 9 (2000) was devoted to Demetrios of Phaleron, vol. 10 (2001) to Dikaiarchos of Messana, vol. 11 (2002) to Eudemos of Rhodes, and vol. 12 (2004) to Lykon of Troas and Hieronymos of Rhodes. The first volume of the series (1983) was on Areos Didymos; vols. 2 (1985), 3 (1988), 5 (1992) and 8 (1998) dealt with Theophrastos; vol. 4 (1989) focused on Cicero’s knowledge of the Peripatos, vol. 6 (1994) on Peripatetic rhetoric after Aristotle; vol. 7 (1995) was titled “The passionate intellect: essays on the transformation of classical traditions” and was presented to Professor I. G. Kidd. All in all almost 5000 pages, this series is certainly the most influential publication on (mostly) Peripatetic thought available today. Work on other members of the Peripatetic School is said to be in progress (see the editors’ preface, p. VII).

2 The essays are revised versions of papers presented at a conference on The Early Hellenistic Lyceum, held at the University of Texas at Austin on 29-31 March 2001.

3 I do not know the amount of each scholar’s contribution, but at least some of the authors of the following papers seem to refer to Stork when citing the notes and translation (cf. p. 261 n. 1, p. 262 n. 2, 3, p. 316 n. 44), and the back flap of the volume mentions “Peter Stork’s new edition”. In the following, the edition is referred to with the abbreviation SFOD as proposed by the editors (p. 8).
Most of the texts are what traditionally are called testimonia rather than fragmenta, but this has been the deliberate choice of the editors (see p. 4), and similar principles have been followed in earlier editions.\(^4\) The edition certainly surpasses earlier ones, although as always, it owes much to them.\(^5\) As the attribution of several fragments is the object of heated discussion by various scholars, the inclusion of not only the “amphisbetoumena” but also the “non recepta” can only be commended (note that in the latter section the texts are printed whenever Wehrli and/or Knögel print the text as a fragment of Ariston of Keos; in all other cases only a reference to the text is given, cf. p. 5). The texts are numbered from 1 to 49, and in some cases one number covers two or more (parallel) texts, which are distinguished by the letters A, B etc. In the case of the longest fragment, coming from PHerc. 1008, the columns of the papyrus have been numbered separately (21a-o). The edition is relatively user-friendly and has all the necessary information readily available. This includes the Greek (or Latin) text, a facing English translation, upper apparatus of parallel texts, lower critical apparatus, and notes to the translation (these are of special importance, for besides supplying information for understanding and interpreting the text, including polemics with earlier translations, they also place it within the wider context of the work from which the text has been taken, cf. p. 6). There are plenty of cross-references within the edition, as well as references to papers in the same volume.

From the eight essays that follow, six focus more or less on the person or work of Ariston, and two deal with natural science. All in all, there are many recurring interpretative and methodological issues. The main problem that almost every contributor is forced to deal with is the identity of Ariston and the confusion between the Stoic Ariston of Chios and the Peripatetic Ariston of Keos (in addition to other, less known Aristons). Their similarly sounding places of origin do not make the task easier and have caused confusion already among ancient authors. It is only natural that the most well-known work of Ariston, his Περὶ τοῦ κοινῆς ἰπερηψανίας (fr. 21a-o SFOD; quoted and paraphrased by Philodemos), which occupies 47 of the 124 pages that actually contain texts (i.e. almost 2/5), deserves most attention in the papers. The major inconsistency in this volume is the fact that one of the eight contributors believes the

\(^4\) Cf. already the edition of the fragments of Theophrastos (published by Brill in 1992 and 1993), which notes some of these (p. 5ff.): in the case of sources, the editors choose to be inclusive rather than exclusive; they give up the division into “genuine” fragments and testimonia, etc.

\(^5\) One should especially mention two earlier editions: F. Wehrli’s Die Schule des Aristoteles (Heft 6: Lykon und Ariston von Keos. 2., ergänzte und verbesserte Aufl., Basel and Stuttgart 1968) and W. Knögel’s Der Peripatetiker Ariston von Keos bei Philodem (Leipzig 1933).
author of this work to be the Stoic Ariston of Chios, while the others, if they take a position, prefer the Peripatetic Ariston of Keos. However, it is an inconsistency only if we take this volume to be a dogmatic edition or handbook and not a representation of an ongoing discussion of the issues, a source of various and, in some cases, competing views, that it really is. Thus, the inclusion of this “heretic” paper can only be welcomed. Note that the editors of the fragments have been cautious and present the fragments of Περὶ τοῦ κοινῆς θεωρίας in the section “Disputed”.

The topics covered in the papers reflect the contents of Ariston’s extant writings (whether certain or disputed) on the one hand, and the interests and focuses of the contributors (e.g. papyrology), on the other. Of course there are other fascinating topics that could have been dealt with in more detail, e.g. Ariston’s position as the Peripatetic scholarch and Lykon’s successor (a synopsis is given by D. Hahm on p. 184f.), or a comparison of the Peripatetic tradition of character writing, and especially Ariston, with the Stoic interest in the topic (men like Chrysippos or Poseidonios; cf. p. 230, 242, 268 n. 18). In addition, spoiled by excellent contributions on Arabic material in some of the previous volumes of the RUSCH series, one wonders if the Arabic sources have nothing on Ariston.

As the essays have no abstracts, and the titles alone, as often, fail to convey the rich content behind them, I will, in the following, give a synopsis of each paper.

The first paper is by David Hahm (D.H., “In search of Aristo of Ceos”, pp. 179-215), who is concerned with the identity of Ariston of Keos. He points out that there are problems that have obscured our understanding of the identity and achievement of Ariston: first of all, the fact that there are more than one ancient philosophical writers named Ariston, and many ancient sources do not specify which man is meant. Thus, the identification of the author of a fragment is in many cases inconclusive. The established methodology of reconstructing the work of lost authors has, as D.H. concludes, its limitations, and in the case of the attribution of incompletely identified references the most we can achieve at this point is the construction of several equally plausible possibilities (p. 183). There is, however, an alternative methodology for dealing with lost texts: here, the references are not extracted from their context to create “fragments”, but rather are treated as being essentially testimonia. According to these principles, D.H. surveys the major sources of information on Ariston of Keos to determine what they knew about him, whether they can discriminate Ariston of Keos from other Aristons, and to which Ariston they
may have thought they were referring when they alluded to an Ariston without further identification (p. 183f.). After going through the references in Diogenes Laertios, Panaitios, Cicero, Strabon, Plutarch, Athenaios and Stobaios, D.H. concludes that throughout the entire period there is no evidence of any confusion between the two best-known Aristons, and the confusion can be found only among modern interpreters. The source of this confusion seems to be an isolated ancient delusion reported (but not really endorsed) by Diogenes Laertios, viz. Panaitios’ attempt to distance himself and the Stoic school from Ariston’s ideas by alleging that the philosophical works circulating under his name were really written by Ariston of Keos (p. 211). In the case of works transmitted only on papyrus, however, the results of this method amount more or less to the same equal possibilities. Thus, other arguments come to play, for which see below.

The two Italian papers of the volume deal with papyrological material, focusing on the texts and identification problems of the Ariston quoted by Philodemos. Tiziano Dorandi (T.D., “I framenti papiracei di Aristone di Ceo”, pp. 217-38) begins by stating that the identification of the Ariston in Philodemos is the most difficult problem that the editors of the fragments of Ariston of Keos are faced with.

The first section of the essay discusses textual problems in Philodemos’ Περί κακιῶν (also known as Περί ὑπερηφανίας), PHerc. 1008 col. 10.10-30, where the name of Ariston appears for the first time. It also gives some information on the status of the papyrus, available editions and studies, a bulk of which are by Italian scholars (notably Marcello Gigante and Mario Capasso). The reconstruction of the text of col. 10 is that of Anna Angeli (unpublished to the date of publication of the present volume, but put to use in it, cf. p. 71 n. 2), who has demonstrated that some emendations that G. Ranocchia has made in his edition (see below, n. 7) are based on false textual basis and should be refuted (p. 221; although not all, e.g. ἀπετέμετο in col. 10.28-29 is accepted). This concerns especially col. 10.12-15, where Ranocchia (2001) reads (I omit the dots under letters) ἐπιστολικὰ τὸ ἱδιὸν μὲν ἐπισθεν [τῶν δὲ] τὴν ὑπερήφανον ἰδιὸν κτλ. Angeli, who has reinspected the papyrus, reads ἐπιστολή[ν τὸ] ἱδιὸν μὲν ἐπισθεν τῶν διὰ τὴν ὑπερήφανον ἰδιὸν κτλ. This is also accepted.

in the present edition, whereby ἐπιστολήν was already the reading of Jensen in 1911 (later in 1930 Jensen suggested the reading ἐπιστομήν, which has had many supporters, e.g. Knögel, Wehrli, Capasso and Mouraviev; ἐπιστολικὰ was suggested by Gigante; cf. G. Ranocchia’s paper below for the refutation of the reading ἐπιστομήν). Entirely new are Angeli’s readings τι ἡδίνων and ἐκείνων. T.D. quotes aplenty from Angeli’s unpublished work, where she comments on τι ἡδίνων (p. 222f.). Finally he notes that there is no need to suppose that Philodemos draws on more than one work of Ariston, as was suggested by Wehrli (cf. also the paper of S. Vogt below).

The second section analyses two further passages of Philodemos (in his Περὶ κολακείας) that mention Ariston. One of these passages (fr. 20 SFOD) was already included in Wehrli’s edition; the other (fr. 19 SFOD) was discovered later and we only have an apograph of the text (the papyrus itself has been lost). In these two cases Philodemos attacks the positions of an Ariston who is not further identified. T.D. concludes that there is nothing to prevent us from identifying him as the Peripatetic, and that Philodemos’ source could be the same as in other passages, i.e. Ariston’s Περὶ τοῦ κοφίζειν ὑπερθομανίας although this cannot be proved.

The third section presents a summary of the scholarly debate over the identity of Ariston in Philodemos, starting from editor princeps of Philodemos’ treatise, Luigi Caterino (1827), and focusing on studies that have contributed something new to the topic. From the authors of these studies, Luigi Caterino, Augusto Rostagni, Carlo Gallavotti and in recent times Anna Maria Ioppolo have argued for the Stoic, whereas Hermann Sauppe, Christian Jensen, Giorgio Pasquali, Wilhelm Knögel, Marcello Gigante have supported the Peripatetic philosopher.

Graziano Ranocchia (G.R.), who recently published an edition of col. 10 and 21-3 of PHer.c. 1008, also discusses the identity of the Ariston in Philodemos (“L’Autore del Περὶ τοῦ κοφίζειν ὑπερθομανίας: Un problema riaperto”, pp. 239-59). Note that he is the only one of the contributors to this volume who explicitly favours the Stoic Ariston of Chios as the author of the work. The first section of his paper focuses on the epistolary form of Ariston’s treatise. G.R. first presents, with some modifications, col. 10.10-30 of his own edition of

---

The crucial passage for him is l. 12-13, where some editors read a word that connects Ariston’s treatise with epistolary form, and some do not. G.R. proceeds by summarizing readings and interpretations of the passage by various scholars. (The information is to a great degree the same as in T.D.’s paper above.) He underlines that the papyrus reading cannot be ἐπιτομήν, and the main argument for the Stoic authorship, the epistolary form of the treatise, has thus emerged again. It is well known that the work Letters is the only one from the list presented by Diogenes Laertios (7.163) that was not assigned to Ariston the Peripatetic by Panaitios and Sosikrates. The epistolary form in itself is perhaps not as strong a proof that the author was Ariston the Stoic as G.R. claims, but it reopens discussion about the identity of the author that seemed to have come to an end with the wide acceptance of the reading ἐπιτομήν.

The second section compares Ariston’s work with the Peripatetic tradition. The similarity of his treatise with the Characters of Theophrastos has been one of the main arguments for attributing it to the Peripatetic Ariston. G.R. aims to show that the treatise cannot be Peripatetic also for reasons of content. He notes that there are substantial discrepancies between the Peripatetic tradition (including the Characters of Theophrastos) and the text of Ariston, and he believes that these discrepancies are strong arguments against Peripatetic authorship (cf. the paper of S. Vogt below, who argues to the contrary).

In the final section of the paper, G.R. argues that Ariston’s treatise is a protreptic letter that is divided into two sections. The first of these sections collects a series of exhortations, each of which focuses on a particular aspect of ἵπερηπανία. Here, Philodemus does not cite his source directly. The intent of this section is said to be paraenetical rather that characterological, and the examination of formal characters shows that this is an example of exhortatio, which, together with dissuasio, constitutes one part of protreptic ethics (p. 252). The second of these sections is characterological in nature and contains direct quotations from Ariston. It is a meticulous review of subtypes of the ἵπερηπανος, among which Ariston distinguishes seven categories. The unique aim of the treatise is, according to G.R., to provide a remedy for the vice (p. 253). The more characterological flavour of the second section, he proceeds, is not an aim in itself, but serves the protreptic character of the whole treatise, which again suggests Stoic authorship. Other arguments in favour of the Stoic

---

8 One of the changes concerns l. 15, where G.R. reads [ἐτ][αὶ][ρ]ον, not [ἀφρόν]ον, which stands in his preliminary edition (where he has a note supplevi exempli gratia in the apparatus). In his forthcoming full edition of PHerc. 1008.10-24, a preprint of which has been made available on-line, G.R. suggests the reading [ἀφρα][ρ]ον.
include a re-interpretation of the verb κοινφίζειν that appears in the title of Ariston’s treatise, and the compatibility of Philodemos’ extensive use of Ariston’s text and his evident confidence in Ariston’s persuasive force with the eloquence and persuasiveness attributed to the man in ancient sources.

Two of the essays focus on the character types in Ariston. Sabine Vogt (S.V., “Characters in Aristo”, pp. 261-78) investigates the tradition of character studies in which Ariston stands, with the main focus on the purposes of the texts that provide what she calls “conceptual” and “inferential” definitions (p. 261).9 First, she provides her own answers to three basic questions connected with the study of the text of Ariston/Philodemos: 1) Which part of the text should we ascribe to Ariston, and which to Philodemos? 2) Did Philodemos draw on one work by Ariston, or two? 3) Which Ariston does Philodemos cite? For the first question Philodemos provides clear signals in the text (cf. also p. 69 n. 1): he first gives a long summary of Ariston’s work (21a.30-21g.27 SFOD), and then shifts to direct speech, which is explicitly marked as a quotation. S.V. disagrees with Jeffrey Rusten (1993 Loeb editor of Theophrastos’ Characters and some sections of Ariston’s text) who believed that some passages in the Ariston quotation are Philodemos’ comments: there is no need to recreate a truly “Theophrastean” Ariston by attributing all references to definitions and evaluations of the character traits to Philodemos. S.V.’s answer to the second question is a bit startling: it is simpler and more logical to assume that Philodemos continues citing the same book of Ariston, and those who are in favour of different works, should provide convincing arguments. The third question is again about the identity of Ariston. S.V. favours Ariston of Keos and believes that her account of Ariston’s position within the tradition of character studies provides further evidence supporting this attribution. This tradition, S.V. claims, is thoroughly Peripatetic, its form and techniques are very stable, and the discrepancies between Ariston’s treatment of arrogance and Peripatetic doctrine are not strong arguments against identifying the Ariston here with the Peripatetic from Keos (p. 263-4; cf. G. Ranocchia’s paper above).

In the second section of the paper, S.V. presents a concise and useful synopsis of the ways in which literary characterization is constructed. She distinguishes two basic ways (p. 264): 1) describing someone’s character directly, e.g. by supplying epithets or an explicit evaluation; 2) characterizing someone indirectly by narrating what they do or say or think. Further, S.V. uses the distinction between “inferential” and “conceptual” approach to character study (p.

---

9 Note the unfortunate misprint on p. 261: for αὐθάδης read ἥπερφιθανος.
265). In the case of inferential approach, the signs from which character is inferred are either internal (motivations and reasons which lead to specific behaviour) or external (bodily features and appearance). The conceptual approach defines character types by linguistic or logical methods: correlating distinct traits and types by comparing or contrasting similar or opposing types, by isolating subtypes, and by analysing their component factors or features. Keeping this distinction in mind, S.V. shortly touches upon character studies in Aristotle and Aristotelian corpus (Rhetoric, ethical works, On virtues and vices, Physiognomics) and in Theophrastos. She concludes that the approach of Aristotle is mainly inferential, focusing on internal signs of motivations and reasons in the soul, whereas the approach of Theophrastos, while being also inferential, is focused entirely on external signs offered by observed behaviour (what W.W. Fortenbaugh has called “superficial behavioural regularities” or “Verhaltensregelmäßigkeiten”). However, in Aristotle the conceptual approach is also firmly established (each type receives a definition). Of the two pseudo-Aristotelian treatises, On virtues and vices relies solely on a conceptual approach and Physiognomics solely on an inferential approach (p. 271).

The third section of the paper focuses on Ariston’s approach to character traits. S.V. concludes (p. 272) that Ariston skilfully combines both methods found in earlier Peripatetic tradition, i.e. the inferential (isolating superficial behavioural regularities), and the conceptual (defining traits by ways of opposites and synonyms, and subtypes and blends [for the latter, see V. Tsouna’s paper below]).

The final section looks more closely at Ariston’s account of two types: ὑπερήφανος and εἰρων (both of these also feature in Theophrastos and Aristotle). The first case shows that the basic conception of arrogance is largely the same in all three authors; the second case illustrates the clash of two different ideas even within the same school.

Voula Tsouna (V.T., “Aristo on blends of arrogance”, pp. 279-92) also assumes that we are dealing with Ariston of Keos, not the Stoic from Chios (a useful synopsis of the arguments to the contrary by A.M. Ioppolo, as well as their refutation, is found in note 1, p. 279f.). She focuses on what are believed to be

---

10 The application of Peirce’s theory of semiosis, on which the notion of inference from signs is said to be based (p. 265 n. 10), should perhaps have been further clarified. As it stands, the text suggests that the term “interpretant” equals “interpretor” (“the person who interprets”), which is not the case in the context of semiotic theory.
the ideas of Ariston, but also draws upon Philodemos, who quotes and paraphrases (and sometimes corrects) him.

In the first section, V.T. situates Ariston’s views on arrogance in the broader context of systematic exploration of the vice. In his treatise, arrogance is defined as a dispositional state (δυσθέσις) whose central characteristics are disdain and offensive pride, and which is manifested in behaviour and action. Arrogance, she notes, is not merely a matter of having a high opinion about one’s abilities, but it also entails forming a high opinion about oneself, especially in those areas that are relevant to the good life (p. 282). In addition, arrogance has an essentially interpersonal dimension, which is evident in the writings of both Ariston and Philodemos. Human relationships for the arrogant man are hierarchical and non-reciprocal, and by this fundamental incapacity to relate to others in a reciprocal manner he corrodes the social fabric to which he belongs. V.T. further notes that this complete distortion of interpersonal relationships is the main reason why arrogance should be considered irrational (p. 283). Another characteristic of arrogance is the lack of self-knowledge, obtuseness towards oneself, which makes the eradication of the vice a particularly difficult task (p. 284). Excessive self-confidence and the lack of cooperative virtues are particularly noticeable in Ariston’s characters, especially in the types of the self-willed man and of the know-it-all (p. 284f.). An external factor causally connected to arrogance is luck. Ariston’s writing, the author notes, is focused exclusively on people who are arrogant on account of their good fortune. V.T. sees one reason for this in the connection he and other ancient thinkers traced between arrogance and hybris (p. 285 n. 14). There are, according to Philodemos (and Ariston), several ways for the cure of arrogance (eight of them are discussed on p. 286 and a detailed discussion is presented elsewhere).

The second section of the paper discusses Ariston’s concept of blends and the relation between arrogance and other vicious characteristics in each blend. As V.T. notes (p. 287), Ariston describes complex traits centred on arrogance, specifies the place of arrogance in each of them, and differentiates each vice from other character-features of the same “family”. These blends include the inconsiderate man (ἀνθρώπος), the self-willed man (αὐθέκαστος), the know-it-all (παντειδήμων), the man affecting dignity (σεμνοκότος), the man who behaves in a haughty manner, or the swaggerer (βρενθυμομένος), the ironic man (εἰρων), the disparager (ἐνευλιστής) and the utter disparager (ἐξευλιστής), the vilifier

---

(οὐδενωτὴς) and the utter vilifier (ἐξοδενωτῆς). Ariston further describes in detail the associated behaviour of each sub-type, as well as practical consequences of having that particular disposition. The conclusions of V.T. regarding the nature and the formal structure of the blends are the following (p. 289f.): each of them has behavioural as well as dispositional aspects; each one is a content-sensitive internal state, causally related to certain types of reactions to situations as these are perceived by the vicious agent; each one is defined in terms of a focal vice, arrogance; each one is further specified by reference to a cluster of other vicious characteristics, which are peripheral and perhaps secondary and subordinate to the primary vice.

In the third section, V.T. argues (cf. p. 281) that although Ariston’s analysis of complex vices cannot be endorsed wholesale today, it does contain some plausible intuitions and is of considerable philosophical interest in its own right. The features considered defensible by V.T. include the identification of arrogance as a focal vice, i.e. the suggestion that several closely resembling character traits largely correspond to one disposition; the notion of blends, which points to the idea that arrogance is the central, most important constituent of other traits constituting each blend; the suggestion that the sense of superiority essential to arrogance varies in its scope, objects, and expressions, and that these variations are determined by the specific cluster of peripheral vices surrounding arrogance; and the underlying idea that the blends are interconnected in ways parallel to the ways in which the virtues entail each other. V.T concludes with the suggestion that Philodemos did not choose to end his treatise by citing Ariston merely on account of the protreptic character of his writing and of its persuasive force (cf. G. Ranocchia’s paper above), but rather for philosophical reasons, which would be considered legitimate today, as well.

Denis M. Searby (D.S., “Aristo of Ceos in the Greek gnomologies”, pp. 293-305) deals with the sayings of Ariston in the Greek gnomological tradition. The intriguing fact is that there are no sayings explicitly attributed to Ariston of Keos, thus the author examines those that may belong to him, but are attributed simply to “Ariston the philosopher”. He first considers the evidence for Ariston of Keos as a collector of sayings, which he finds tenuous. According to the author, the entries associated with an Ariston in the anthology of Stobaios (altogether 16) can, with one exception (4.22a.16), be safely attributed to Ariston of Chios, or at least they belong to a collection of Homoionmata compiled by him. Another candidate is also found in Stobaios, under the lemma Ἑκ τῶν Ἁριστοτέλους Χρειῶν. This work has been explained as a collection attributed to Aristotle later and, although not compiled by him, still being
a part of the Peripatetic tradition (it may contain sayings of various philosophers starting with Aristotle), or as a corruption of the *Chreiai* of Ariston mentioned by Diogenes Laertios, in which case it may belong to the Peripatetic Ariston. However, the manuscript tradition in this case is uniform and has no Ariston as a variant of Aristotle. Thus, if we are really dealing with a confusion of names, it must have taken place quite early, certainly before the time of Stobaios. As to evidence for Ariston’s own sayings, there are four of those attributed to an Ariston in the manuscripts representing the tradition of *Gnomologium Vaticanum*. According to the author, none of these appear anywhere else in the gnomological tradition. It has been claimed that all of them come from the lost *Homoiomata* of Ariston of Chios, which D.S. seems to hold possible, although casting some doubt. After a brief commentary on these sayings, he concludes that we do not know enough to make a secure choice between the two Aristons. He seems, however, to prefer Ariston of Chios as the author.

The two concluding articles deal with natural science. Robert W. Sharples (R.S., “Natural philosophy in the Peripatos after Strato”, pp. 307-27) focuses on a striking feature in the history of the Peripatetic school — the decline in interest in natural philosophy after Theophrastos and Straton. This interest in natural philosophy in its own right was, as it seems, peculiar in the context of other philosophical schools. In any case, the interest in nature was peripheral for later Peripatetics. R.S. examines the scanty evidence in three 3rd century authors: Lykon, Hieronymos of Rhodes and Ariston of Keos (with an epilogue on Kritolaos). The evidence for any concern with nature is most tenuous in the case of Lykon, but the situation is not better in the case of Hieronymos either. More pages are devoted to Ariston, but the reason for this is the content of the volume rather than Ariston’s greater interest in natural philosophy. Ariston is cited for the effects on the mind of water from a fountain in his home island Keos (fr. 17A SFOD). R.S.’s analysis of the sources of this fragment and its parallels (cf. 17B-D SFOD), textual problems and questions of dating, authorship and transmission is an interesting survey in its own right, but does not really add much to Ariston’s views on natural philosophy. The author concludes that the passages in question do not indicate a primary concern with natural philosophy.\(^\text{12}\)

In the epilogue R.S. looks more closely at Kritolaos, who was probably the successor of Ariston as head of the Peripatetic school. Things are different with

\(^{12}\) R.S. defines natural philosophy narrowly so that it excludes epistemology (cf. p. 308), e.g. some passages in Hieronymos (fr. 10 and 40 White, which are, however, discussed later in the text).
him: he expressed views on a range of topics in physics. But the claim of R.S. is that his aim may have been rather to reassert (what he understood to be) Aristotelian doctrines, with the desire to distance them from those of the Stoics (p. 323f.). However, he chose to do so in the context of physics (although not only physics, cf. p. 323), which in this reviewer’s opinion might suggest at least some revival of the interest, albeit peripheral, in the subject.

The article of Oliver Hellmann (O.H., “Peripatetic biology and the Epitome of Aristophanes of Byzantium”, pp. 329-59) is a kind of appendage to the volume, as it only mentions Ariston in passing. O.H. first presents a synopsis of the Peripatetic zoology from Theophrastos to Ariston (note that there is no mention of botany, which was Theophrastos’ special interest, except in connection with Phainias of Eresos, p. 330). He notes that Aristotle’s and Theophrastos’ interest in biology was not shared by their successors, although there is evidence that Eudemos of Rhodes conducted zoological research, and that Straton produced a number of biological works. As for Straton’s successors, the evidence for Lykon’s interest in biology is tenuous (cf. also R. Sharples’ paper above), and nothing is known about any zoological interests of Hieronymos of Rhodes or Ariston of Keos. But the situation was different in Alexandria, where at about the same time Aristophanes of Byzantium prepared a compilation of Aristotle’s zoological writings. (Peripatetic science had already been “transplanted” to Alexandria by Straton, who worked as a teacher of Ptolemaios II Philadelphos, cf. Diog. Laert. 5.58.) The content, structure and purpose of this Epitome, which greatly influenced the transmission of Peripatetic biological thought and knowledge, are the subject of the rest of the paper. The Epitome also contains non-Aristotelian material (p. 334), it is rearranged from an order by “parts” (as in Aristotle) to an order by species (p. 335f.), and there are some fundamental differences between Aristophanes and Aristotle (p. 337). O.H. further illustrates the work of the epitomator with comparisons of the descriptions of two animals, the wolf and the hedgehog, in Aristophanes and Aristotle.

The last section of the paper deals with the purpose and intentions of the Epitome, which the author considers to be a popular handbook of biology (as opposed to scientific biology) rather than a work generated only by lexicographic and literary interests. To explain his point, O.H. presents a comparison of the Epitome with a modern zoological handbook, The mammals of Britain and Europe by G. Corbet and D. Ovenden (1980), again using wolves and hedgehogs as examples.
Despite its merits, the volume bears some marks of editorial haste. Thus, the bibliography of the section “Aristo of Ceos: The Sources, Text and Translation” contains references to papers in the same volume, but evidently some of the titles have been slightly changed after the completion of the bibliography (reference to Hahm on p. 21 and Searby on p. 23). There is some inconsistency in transcribing Greek names (e.g. Heraclides on p. 188f. vs. Heracleides on p. 195 n. 41). The confusion about Ariston’s identity is also reflected in some passages of the volume (e.g. on p. 36 the Latin text prints “Aristo Ceus”, while the translation on the opposite page reads “Aristo of Chios”). The format of references in the bibliography differs slightly from paper to paper (e.g. journal abbreviations in G.R.’s paper vs. full titles in others), and at times one has the feeling that a general (and thus more uniform) bibliography would have been more useful (especially in the case of T.D. and G.R., where the bibliographies are to a large degree repetitive). One misses the reference to fr. 15 SFOD in a passage that discusses Ariston’s work Lykon mentioned by Plutarch (p. 207f.), etc. Although these technical inconsistencies do not affect in any way the valuable and thought-provoking content of the volume, I believe that the number of misprints and typographical blunders (of which I found around 40, including the most embarrassing ones in Greek words on p. 8, 15, 18 [twice], 221, and 227 [twice]), could have been kept smaller.

Ivo Volt
University of Tartu
Department of Germanic and Romance Philology, Chair of Classical Philology
Ülikooli 17
EST–51014 Tartu, Estonia
E-mail: Ivo.Volt@ut.ee

---

13 This is an excerpt from fr. 18 SFOD (= Cicero, Cato Maior de Senectute 1.3), which is found on p. 62-65. There, the Latin text also reads “Aristo Chius”, and we are told that “Ceus” is what Powell prints in his edition. See also p. 65 n. 6 on the attribution history of the fragment. From the contributors of the present volume, G. Ranocchia prefers “Chius” (not explicitly in the essay, but cf. his paper “Aristo Ceus o Aristo Chius? Postilla al problema testuale di Cic. Cato Maior 3,” in Elenchos 24.1 (2003), 115-22), while D. Hahm (p. 180f. and 201f.; reference to this might have been added to p. 65) believes that the comparative evidence seems to weigh slightly in favour of Ariston of Keos.

14 Perhaps then mistakes such as Caterini pro Caterino (p. 241, 258, correctly on p. 236) and RFIC pro Bollettino di Filologia Classica (p. 258 [Gallavotti 1933], correctly on p. 236), as well as errors in some publication dates (Gomperz 1888 on p. 237 should be 1889) or volume numbers (48 in the case of Philippson 1934 on p. 259 pro 54, correctly on p. 237) could have been avoided.